A growing body of literature reports evidence of social interaction effects in survey expectations. In this note, we argue that evidence in favor of social interaction effects should be treated with caution, or could even be spurious. Utilizing a parsimonious stochastic model of expectation formation and dynamics, we show that the existing sample sizes of survey expectations are about two orders of magnitude too small to reasonably distinguish between noise and interaction effects. Moreover, we argue that the problem is compounded by the fact that highly correlated responses among agents might not be caused by interaction effects at all, but instead by model-consistent beliefs. Ultimately, these results suggest that existing survey data cannot facilitate our understanding of the process of expectations formation. * Financial support by the Volkswagen Foundation through its grant program on "Complex Networks As Interdisciplinary Phenomena" is gratefully acknowledged. MM is thankful for financial support from the Research Promotion Plan 2010 of Universitat Jaume I, received during his visit to Castell\'on in that year.
Introduction
Expectations play a central role in economic theory, yet we know rather little about the actual process of expectation formation. Aiming for a positive theory of expectations formation, a growing body of literature emphasizes the importance of social interactions in the process of expectation formation, and mostly finds empirical support for interaction effects in reported survey data regarding macroeconomic and financial indicators. These survey expectations typically consist of several hundred monthly responses by several hundred agents. Here we consider a generic stochastic model of expectation dynamics that contains both a social interaction component and an exogenous signal that represents model-consistent beliefs.
1 The purpose of this note is to show that it is essentially not possible to disentangle the two effects in existing survey data, and that even if social interactions were present, the required sample size to identify interaction effects is about two orders of magnitude larger than existing sample sizes. Even if we are willing to make strong assumptions about the structure of multidimensional responses, existing survey data remain a very fragile source for the identification of interaction effects or modelconsistent beliefs. The more fundamental point we would like to argue here is that correlations in survey responses do not provide suitable data for a testable theory of expectations formation. While we are admittedly sympathetic to agent-based modeling, in particular its overarching theme of social interactions, we nevertheless have to point out that the metaphor of social interaction essentially remains as unobservable, and therefore untestable, as the more orthodox approaches revolving around unobservable preferences and ad hoc assumptions about the degree of rationality in expectations formation.
Modern macroeconomics assumes that agents know the 'true' model underlying the macroeconomic laws of motion, and that their predictions of the future are on average correct. In their extensive review, Pesaran and Weale (2006) find little if any evidence that survey expectations are model-consistent in this strong sense, which is hardly surprising given the complexity of our macroscopic environment. Weaker forms of macroeconomic rationality acknowledge that agents face model uncertainty and instead focus on learning (see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, Milani, 2010) , informational rigidities (see, e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2008 , Mankiw and Reis, 2002 , Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers, 2004 , imperfect information (see, e.g., Del Negro and Eusepi, 2009 , Woodford, 2001 , and 'rational inattention' (see, e.g., Sims, 2003) . While details of the forward-looking be-havior of agents are crucial for the qualitative differences among these approaches, neither of them considers the actual process of expectations formation.
Recent econometric approaches are discussing the existence of heterogeneity in the updating behavior of forecasters (see, e.g., Clements, 2010) , and laboratory experiments equally indicate heterogeneity in expectations (see, e.g., Hommes, 2010) . The focus on heterogeneity intersects with another strand of research that emphasizes the importance of social interactions in the process of expectations formation. Empirical work on social interactions has traditionally employed discrete choice frameworks that allow for social spillovers in agents' utility (see, e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001) , but this approach has been rather static in the sense that cross-sectional configurations are viewed as self-consistent equilibria. The discrete choice framework has also been investigated in the context of macroeconomic expectations formation, for instance by positing that agents choose between forming extrapolative expectations and (costly) rational expectations (see, e.g., Lines and Westerhoff, 2010) , which can lead to endogenous fluctuations in macroeconomic variables. Carroll (2003) suggests an alternative route to social interactions, hypothesizing that the diffusion of news from professional forecasters to the rest of the public leads to 'stickyness' in aggregate expectations. The diffusion of expectations is also a defining characteristic in several recent contributions that place greater emphasis on social interactions than on individual concepts of rationality in their study of (survey) expectations. These probabilistic approaches by and large aim for positive models of expectations formation, but yield mixed results so far. Bowden and McDonald (2008) study the diffusion of information in various network structures and find a trade-off between volatility in aggregate expectations and the speed at which agents learn the correct state of the world. Secondly, they argue that certain network structures can lead to information cascades. This would be consistent with the empirical results of Flieth and Foster (2002) , who find that survey expectations are characterized with protracted periods of inertia punctuated by occasional switches from aggregate optimism to pessimism or vice versa. They also calibrate a model of 'interactive expectations' with multiple probabilistic equilibria from the data, which indicates that social interactions would have become less important over time. Lux (2009) confirms the empirical quality of survey expectations, with their pronounced swings in aggregate opinions, but he claims evidence in favor of strong interaction effects.
Since both consider German survey expectations and utilize similar probabilistic formalizations of the expectations process, the question why they find conflicting results on the importance of interaction effects warrants some attention and leads back to the issue whether survey expectations allow for a testable theory of expectations formation. Both papers formalize changes in expectations through transition probabilities that additively combine an autonomous and an interactive element. While Flieth and Foster (2002) employ a three-state model that can only be solved numerically, Lux (2009) uses a two-state model that exploits well-known results in Markov chain theory and allows for closed-form solutions not only of the limiting distribution but, in principle, of the entire time evolution of the expectations process. Yet irrespective of a model's details, we want to argue here that the different findings are likely to originate from size limitations of existing surveys, because even if we knew the details of the disaggregated interaction mechanism, including the exact parameterization of the expectations process and the network structure among agents, we would still not be capable of distinguishing between interaction effects and essentially random correlations in survey responses. Nor would we be able to distinguish model-consistent beliefs from social interactions in the first place, which gives even more reason for concern, because it implies that we cannot test competing theories of expectations formation based on correlations in survey data.
Stochastic Model of Expectation Dynamics
We place a premium on analytical tractability and thus conduct our investigation in the probabilistic tradition employed by Lux (2009) . A number of results are known in this parsimonious modeling tradition, including (statistical) equilibrium properties for a wide range of model parameters and the time evolution of the probability density of beliefs. Understanding both the quantitative and the qualitative nature of the model enables us to isolate the behavioral details of the expectations process from the question whether it is feasible to detect social interaction effects from the correlation of responses in existing survey data. Moreover, this modeling tradition conveniently incorporates both a social interaction component and an exogenous signal, which allows us to address the more fundamental issue whether we can discriminate between social interactions and an exogenous coordination of model-consistent beliefs, based on correlations in survey responses alone.
The model utilized by Lux (2009) traces back to earlier contributions by Weidlich and Haag (1983) and Weidlich (2006) , and is quite similar to the herding model of Kirman (1991 Kirman ( , 1993 . We will focus on a generalized version of Kirman's model here for which Alfarano and Milaković (2009) have provided a disaggregated description of the individual processes of expectations formation. Models in the Weidlich-Haag-Lux tradition have so far only provided an aggregate description of the process of expectations formation, and thus generally have fewer testable implications because of the aggregation procedure. Lux, for instance, has to incorporate an additional parameter that he terms 'effective system size' in order to obtain significant interaction effects. What this effective system size might be, what might cause it, or how one would observe and measure it remain, however, unanswered issues. Hence we will employ the disaggregated description of Kirman's model here. A prototypical setup in Weidlich's or Kirman's tradition considers a population of agents of size N that is divided into two groups, say, X and Y of sizes n and N − n, respectively. In the context of survey expectations, the two groups would correspond to agents who have optimistic or pessimistic beliefs regarding the future state of an economic or financial indicator.
The basic idea is that agents change state (i) because they follow an idiosyncratic exogenous signal, representing for instance news about fundamental variables in the macroeconomy, or (ii) because of the social interaction with their neighbors. We conceptualize the network of social relationships as an (unweighted) graph, that is a collection of vertices and edges, where the vertices correspond to agents that are linked via (bi-directional) edges if they are socially interacting with each other. A graph is conveniently encoded through an N × N adjacency matrix E with elements e i j = 1 if agents i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and j ∈ {1, . . . , N} are neighbors, and e i j = 0 otherwise. Since the edges are bi-directional, E is symmetric; by convention e ii = 0 ∀i, so agents are never connected to themselves.
The number of neighbors for each agent i is given by the column vector e = E · 1 with elements e i , where 1 designates a column vector of ones. Define the column vector s X such that its elements s X i = 1 if agent i is in state X and s X i = 0 otherwise. Analogously, we obtain the column vector s Y = 1 − s X for agents that are in state Y. Consequently, the respective number of neighbors that are in state X is given by the vector n X = E s X with elements n X i , and the number of neighbors in state Y is n Y = E s Y = e − s X with elements n Y i . The central idea is to formulate the expectations formation process as a Markov chain, where the transition rate for an agent i to switch from state X to state Y during a given time period is
The parameter a i governs the possibility of self-conversion, for instance caused by model-consistent beliefs, while λ i governs the interaction strength between i and its neighbors. Analogously the transition rates in the opposite direction, from a pessimistic to an optimistic state, are given by
As a consequence of the interactions between neighboring agents, the rates π ± i still depend on the particular configurations of neighbors.
2 This makes it diffi-2 Notice that agents could exhibit an asymmetric idiosyncratic preference for either state by in-cult to handle (1) and (2) analytically, but we can employ a mean-field approximation in order to simplify the problem from a many-agent system to one with a sum of agents who are independently acting in an "external field" (see, e.g., Chap. 5 in Aoki, 1998) created by the opinions of other agents. In other words, we assume that individual agents are influenced by the average opinion of their neighbors, and that their behavioral parameters can be aggregated by averaging over all agents.
On the individual level, the instantaneous probability for agent i to switch from X to Y is given by (1). When the attitudes of i's neighbors fluctuate, π − i fluctuates around its mean π
where the bracket notation · i refers to the mean across i, so it is understood that
The dependence on i gets lost if we assume that inhomogeneities among the different configurations of neighbors are solely due to the fluctuations, which is the essential idea underlying the mean-field approximation. Let the number D = e · 1/N denote the average number of neighbors. Then it will be true on average that the number of Y-neighbors around each agent i is equal to the product of D and the unconditional probability that an i-neighbor is in state Y, which is approximated by the overall frequency (N − n)/N of agents in state Y, yielding
and the quantity π − becomes independent of the particular configurations of neighbors. Symmetrically, the expression for agents currently in state Y becomes
Basically, the mean-field approximation reduces a complex system of heterogeneous interacting agents to a collection of independent agents who are acting "in the field" that is created by other agents' beliefs and their average behavior.
On the aggregate level, we are interested in the probability of observing a single switch on the system-wide level during some time interval ∆t, hence we have to sum (5) over all agents in state Y in order to find the aggregate probability that an agent is switching from state Y to state X during ∆t, assuming that ∆t is small troducing the parameters a 1 i , a 2 i . The formal consequences of such a formulation are discussed in the material following Eq. (11). Since this setup allows for the coordination of beliefs without any interaction effects whatsoever, we generally interpret it as representing the formation of model-consistent beliefs.
enough to constrain the switch to a single agent. Summing (5), which is permissible since the agents are now independent, we obtain
for a switch from Y to X, and
for the reverse switch. 3 For notational convenience, we set
while setting c ≡ λD would recover the original formulation of Kirman's ant model. 4 Notice that the microscopic decomposition of Kirman's aggregate model in Eq.s (1) and (2) provides a precise functional form for the process of individual expectations formation, which (at least so far) is not available for models in the Weidlich-Haag-Lux tradition, and thus allows for testable propositions regarding individual behavior. In addition, analytical results for the aggregation of the individual processes are still available, and conveniently quantify the relative importance of the behavioral (a, b) and topological (D, N) parameters in the process of expectation formation.
The equilibrium concept associated with the generic transition rates (6) and (7) is a statistical equilibrium outcome: at any time, the state of the system refers to the concentration of agents in one of the two states. We define the state of the system through the concentration z = n/N of agents that are in state X. For large N, the concentration can be treated as a continuous variable. Notice that none of the possible states of z ∈ [0, 1] is an equilibrium in itself, nor are there multiple equilibria in the usual economic meaning of the term. The notion of equilibrium instead refers to a statistical distribution that describes the proportion of time the system spends in each state. Utilizing the Fokker-Planck equation, we can show that for large N the equilibrium distribution of z is a beta distribution (see Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner, 2008 , for details)
where B( , ) = Γ( ) 2 /Γ(2 ) is Euler's beta function, while the dimensionless shape parameter of the distribution is given by
Since is a ratio of quantities that depend (i) on the time scale at which the process operates (1/a and 1/λ), and (ii) on the spatial characteristics of the underlying network (D and N), the parameter of the equilibrium distribution is a well-defined dimensionless quantity. If < 1 the distribution is bimodal, with probability mass having maxima at z = 0 and z = 1. Conversely, if > 1 the distribution is unimodal, and in the "knife-edge" scenario = 1 the distribution becomes uniform. The mean value of z, E[z] = 1/2, is independent of , and intuitively follows from the difference of the transition rates (6) and (7), a(N − 2n), showing that in equilibrium the system approaches n = N/2.
Notice, nevertheless, that the system exhibits very different characteristics depending on the modality of the distribution. In the bimodal case, the system spends least of the time around the mean, mostly exhibiting very pronounced herding in either of the extreme states, while mild fluctuations around the mean characterize the unimodal case. The bimodal case is apparently in line with the empirical finding of protracted periods of inertia with sudden switches in aggregate opinion. Since in that case < 1 implies b > a, the model would seem to suggest that social interactions on average carry greater weight than idiosyncratic factors in the expectations formation of agents. The model can also be extended to account for asymmetries in the average aggregate state with the following transition rates
where the constants a 1 and a 2 now allow agents to have a 'bias' towards either state, for instance if a 1 > a 2 they will exhibit more optimistic than pessimistic beliefs on average. 6 In this case (see Alfarano, Lux, and Wagner, 2005 , for details), the 5 The problem leading to Eq. (9) can be solved exactly with finitary methods, see Garibaldi and Scalas (2010) . In that framework, Eq. (9) is retrieved as the continuous limit of a Pólya distribution; incidentally, the same is true of Eq. (12).
6 Recall from the mean-field derivation that it is not necessary that all agents exhibit idiosyncratic asymmetries, but only that there is an asymmetric tendency towards either state on average. corresponding equilibrium distribution is the beta distribution
where
is again the beta function, while the shape parameters are now given by 1 = a 1 /b and 2 = a 2 /b. Figure 1 illustrates the flexibility in the shape of the beta distribution, with unimodal and bimodal cases similar to the symmetric case (9) in the top panel (labeled a and b), but also including monotonically increasing or decreasing cases in situations where agents have a strong idiosyncratic signal in one direction, yet still exhibit a relatively pronounced herding tendency relative to the other state, i.e. a 1 /b < 1 < a 2 /b or vice versa, as shown in the bottom panel (labeled c and d). In summary, the model provides quite a generic description of a stochastic expectations formation process that contains only a few behavioral parameters a 1 , a 2 and b, yet allows for a large degree of agent heterogeneity. Despite its parsimony, the model produces a wide range of qualitatively different statistical equilibria, including endogenous cycles in expectations caused by herding or imitation, but also equilibria where the vast majority of agents 'learns a correct state' in spite of being surrounded by noise that is created through the social interaction with neighboring agents. The qualitative features of the process are also parsimoniously summarized by the ratios (10) or (13), putting us in a position to isolate behavioral aspects from the question whether it is feasible to identify the communication or network structure among agents from survey data.
In the next section we argue that an 'omniscient modeler', endowed with perfect knowledge of the behavioral parameters and network structure among agents, would not be able to reliably recover this network structure based merely on the correlations in survey responses. Perhaps more troubling, if our knowledge is confined to the time evolution of survey responses, we will not even be able to reliably detect whether survey correlations originate from social interactions or model-consistent beliefs.
Random Benchmark and Simulation
We start with a thought experiment, putting ourselves in the position of an omniscient modeler (OM) who chooses a particular behavioral setup and network structure for the model in Section 2. Utilizing the individual transition rates (1) and (2), the OM simulates and records the time evolution of beliefs for all N agents in the system. Afterwards, the OM presents us with data on the individual histories of agents' beliefs (or output for short), from which we have to determine the network structure among agents based on correlations in the time evolution of their beliefs.
In actual data on survey expectations, with typically two to three hundred agents reporting monthly beliefs over roughly two hundred periods, we have no intrinsic knowledge of the network structure whatsoever. So to make life easier for us, the OM even informs us of the exact number e i of neighbors for each agent i = 1, . . . , N. We then compute the e i highest (Pearson) correlations for each agent from the output and report it back to the OM as our best guess of the network structure in the output. To be more precise, and using the same bracket notation as before, we calculate the correlation coefficients
where τ = 0 corresponds to the instantaneous correlation, while other values of τ ∈ Z would denote correlations at the various leads or lags. In return, the OM checks our guesses against the actual identity of neighbors and reveals the fraction of correctly identified neighbors to us. One important question is: how many of the e i neighbors do we expect to guess correctly by pure chance, i.e. irrespective of the correlation among responses? This establishes a random benchmark against which we have to judge the success of correlation-based procedures.
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In order to explain the random benchmark, it is instructive to consider a simple urn model. Let us draw d (read: e i ) colored balls without replacement from an urn containing a total of N balls, m of which are white (read: the true neighbors of agent i). The probability of drawing k ≤ m white balls in d draws from a total of N balls is given by the hypergeometric distribution
where the notation on the right hand side refers to binomial coefficients. In other words, (15) characterizes the distribution of the number of white balls drawn from the urn in d extractions. The mean value of the hypergeometric distribution is
from which we can compute the random benchmark since d = m in our OM setup.
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The standard deviation of the hypergeometric distribution is
7 Instead of considering the instantaneous correlation (τ = 0), we have conducted the subsequent analysis with various sums of leads and lags in the correlations of responses,
where τ 0 ∈ N, yet the results remain virtually unchanged for τ 0 ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 50}. The intuitive reason for this is that all agents act on the same time scale. 8 Notice that choosing a different number of extractions does not change any of the qualitative features in the following results, yet the approach immediately translates into quantitative prescriptions for measuring different benchmarks.
To keep our simulations in line with available survey data (for instance from the ZEW for German 'financial experts', or from the FRB Philadelphia for US 'professional forecasters'), we set the number of agents to N = 250; the available length of periods for individual agent IDs is on average between one and two hundred, while the number of questions per survey is typically between thirty and sixty. It will be a sobering experience to recall these figures when we present the simulation results.
Simulation setup
Regarding the network structure in our simulations, we consider three proto-typical setups: random graphs in the Erdös-Renyi tradition, scale-free graphs in the BarabasiAlbert tradition, and regular graph structures. To keep matters simple, we set the number of neighbors equal to twenty.
9 Each vertex in a regular graph possesses the same number of neighbors. We can think of it as a circle where all vertexes have links with D/2 neighbors to the right and D/2 neighbors to the left. In the subsequent simulations, the regular graph consists of a total of 250 vertices and each vertex has ten neighbors to the left and right respectively. A random graph is constructed by randomly adding edges between vertices with some constant probability p, so each edge is included in the graph with probability p independent of every other edge. The distribution of edges per vertex, also known as the degree distribution of the graph, is a binomial distribution with expected value pN. In our simulations the random graph has N = 250 vertices and a linking probability of p = 0.08, so the average number of edges per vertex is pN = 20. Finally, a scale free network is (at least asymptotically) characterized by a power law degree distribution. It might be generated by a so-called preferential attachment mechanism, as (re-)introduced by Barabasi and Albert in order to describe the degree distribution of links among sites on the World Wide Web.
10 Starting with N 0 nodes randomly connected with some probability p 0 , one adds at each step a vertex that forms e edges with the existing vertices, where the probability to add the edge is proportional to the degrees of the existing vertices (hence the term preferential attachment). In our simulations, we start with N 0 = 30 vertices and p 0 = .5, and keep adding e = 20 edges for each new vertex. We stop the procedure as soon as 9 It turns out that changing the number of neighbors in the OM setup has virtually no influence on the subsequent results. We chose twenty neighbors because this figure does not appear to be entirely unrealistic. If anything, the communication with twenty neighbors already takes considerable time and effort in most professions. Notice that Dunbar (1998) estimates the maximum number of acquaintances manageable by a human being to be around 150. 10 Notice that the celebrated Barabasi-Albert model is nothing else but a version of the old and well-known Yule-Zipf-Simon model, as discussed for instance in Garibaldi and Scalas (2010). we reach a total of N = 250 vertexes, yielding again an average connectivity of (approximately) twenty neighbors.
11 Given these numbers and (16) and (17), it is straightforward to compute that the fraction of correct answers we would expect purely by chance corresponds to E In the subsequent figures, we use the mean plus one standard deviation,
.76, to illustrate the statistical significance of the OM experiment. We can compute the probability of such an event from the cumulative hypergeometric distribution: since the hypergeometric distribution is defined for positive integer values of k, we have to consider P(k ≤ 2) = 0.79 and P(k ≤ 3) = 0.94. Hence the range 0 < E[k] + σ[k] < 3 delivers a rather conservative confidence interval in accord with the usual econometric standards. Notice that our computational experiment does not address the issue whether it is feasible to detect the entire graph structure correctly, but rather tests the less ambitious hypothesis that we can reject the random benchmark given a certain sample length. Put differently, rejecting the random benchmark would indicate that some form of coordination plays a significant role in the mechanism of expectations formation.
In line with (1), (2) and (11), the OM implements the transition probabilities φ i for each agent i as
where ∆t = 1/(a max + bN), with a max = max{a 1 , a 2 }, ensures both that 0 < φ i ≤ 1 and that all agents act on the same time scale. The OM then confronts us with the output of the N time series of agents' beliefs, from which we compute N(N − 1)/2 correlation coefficients. For every i, the OM also informs us of the actual number e i of neighbors, and in turn we extract the e i highest correlation coefficients from the output. Intuitively assuming that the highest correlation coefficients correspond to the neighbors of agent i, we construct the adjacency matrix of the agent network and report it to the OM who compares it with the actual adjacency matrix, and informs us of the fraction of correctly identified neighbors for each i. To aggregate and visualize the results for each of the following three scenarios, we average the correctly identified percentages for each agent over the entire pool of agents.
The following scenarios basically consider in how far we can recover the correct network structure (i) depending on the length of agent histories and (ii) depending on the number of simultaneous survey answers per agent, i.e. the volume 
Scenario I: Single indicator histories
Suppose when agents answer questions regarding rather distant areas of expertise (e.g. international equity indices vs bonds vs GDP growth vs inflation etc.), they utilize different networks to form their expectations. So if we use histories for a single indicator in the OM experiment, what is the required number of observations per agent (or sample size for short) that is necessary to discriminate between some genuine network structure and random noise? We consider both a bi-and a unimodal setup to control for behavioral biases, and display summary results under different network structures in Figures 2 and 3 . The figures illustrate that there is little difference between random and scale-free setups, while it is easier to identify neighbors when they are all arranged in a regular lattice. Regular graphs, however, are the least suitable representation of observed social networks, which tend to interpolate between random and scale-free structures (see, e.g., Newman, 2003 , and the references therein). This is also the reason why we focus our attention on random graphs in the coming scenarios.
As one would intuitively suspect, the identification of interaction effects is somewhat facilitated in the bimodal case, i.e. when herding or imitation dominate the expectations formation process. According to Figures 2 and 3 , however, this aspect has merely second-order effects. Up to a sample size of around one thousand periods, we are not able to distinguish between noise and interaction effects if our knowledge is restricted to the time evolution of univariate histories. Hence this also implies that we do not have a sufficient number of empirical survey data at our disposal to reliably identify the social interaction component. Viewed from this perspective, any cluster we identify based on the cross-correlations of answers is essentially pure noise. If we consider the confidence interval in Figures 2 and 3 , the first scenario suggests that it is entirely unrealistic to identify even a rudimentary communication structure unless we increase the frequency of survey responses by one order of magnitude, i.e. from monthly to roughly twice per week. In addition, if we are indeed facing irregular graph structures, the length of single indicator histories that is necessary to correctly identify about half the neighbors turns out to be two orders of magnitude larger than empirical sample sizes. 
Scenario II: Multiple indicator histories
Can we improve the identification of communication structures if we make the strong assumption that behavioral parameters in the expectations formation process of agents do not change across multiple questions, and that their network structure remains unchanged as well? And how many questions would be necessary in that case? To tackle this issue, we keep the parameterizations of the previous scenario and simulate the expectations formation process on a random graph, fixing the length of single question histories to two hundred while successively increasing the number of questions. Essentially, this means that the correlation coefficients are averaged both over agents and over questions. To operationalize this procedure, we fix the parameterization and underlying network structure of social interactions and run K independent simulations of the model for two hundred periods. For each single run of length two hundred, we perform the estimation procedure outlined in the previous scenario, and then average over the K questions.
The results both for uni-and bimodal setups, along with the random benchmark, are displayed in Figure 4 and show that a multivariate correlation-based procedure performs better than in the previous univariate scenario. As expected, a bimodal environment with strong interactions again somewhat facilitates the identification of the network structure, but the more appealing feature of this scenario is that the rate at which we discover actual links is markedly higher than in the univariate case. On the downside, however, the overall accuracy of the correlationbased procedure remains low. Keeping in mind that the empirical volume of survey coverage includes roughly thirty to sixty questions, correlation-based estimates of the interaction structure are almost not significantly different from pure noise, and certainly very low to begin with: we recover merely twenty percent of the actual network structure, and the fraction of correctly identified neighbors increases very Figure 4 : Increasing the number of questions and averaging over them improves the identification of interaction effects compared to the previous univariate scenario. The model parameterizations remain the same as before, and we utilize a random network whose structure remains fixed as well. The underlying univariate responses have a length of two hundred periods.
slowly with the number of questions. In summary, the results from the previous two scenarios should caution against claims that correlation-based procedures in survey data can (even 'indirectly') back out relevant information regarding the network or interaction structure among survey participants (as is done, for example, in recent work by Stolzenburg and Lux, 2010) .
Scenario III: Exogenously switching signal
In both of the preceding scenarios we have assumed that all agents have a strictly positive interaction parameter, which we conveniently set to b = 1. But what happens if some agents are not socially interacting at all (b = 0) and instead form model-consistent beliefs from exogenous signals a 1 , a 2 that we can think of as transmitting the correct state of the world? In principle, these 'rational' agents should Figure 5 : Fraction of correctly identified rational agents who follow a time-varying exogenous signal that is increasingly biased in either direction (denoted by an increasing value of a max ) vs their interaction strength b. At low values of b, the identification generally performs very well, while higher values of b might prevent a reliable detection, depending on the relative value of a max . exhibit highly correlated responses over time if the exogenous signal is sufficiently strong relative to the interaction parameter. If the state of the world does not change over time, the rational agents will all converge to the correct state, making it almost trivial to identify them from correlation-based procedures. In order to maintain an empirically more relevant scenario, we thus assume that the correct state of the world changes every now and then, i.e. the parameters a 1 , a 2 are no longer constant but change over time.
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In this scenario, we keep the total number of agents at N = 250 in our simulations, and the underlying network remains a random graph with an average degree of twenty neighbors. The values ofã 1 =ã 2 =b = 1 are constant over time for the majority ofÑ = 200 agents, while a smaller group of fifty 'rational' agents exhibits time-varying idiosyncratic coefficients, say a 1 (t) and a 2 (t), which essentially measure the speed at which rational agents learn the true state of the world. The time-varying coefficients take on values in the set {1, a max }, where a max = max{a 1 (t), a 2 (t)}. Suppose for instance that a max = 10 and that the currently 'true' state is such that a 1 (0) = 1 and a 2 (0) = 10, i.e. we are in an optimistic regime today. When the true state changes to pessimism, say in period t 0 , the parameters change to a 1 (t 0 ) = 10 and a 2 (t 0 ) = 1. As far as the switching probability in our simulations is concerned, we assume that the probability to switch is five percent, drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. In other words, an exogenous switch in the signal occurs on average every twenty months in our simulations.
The matter in question now concerns the fraction of rational agents that we can correctly identify if the true state of the world changes over time, as it certainly does in reality. (Notice that we have to adapt the error band since now d = m = 50.) None the less, we would expect the value of b to also have an influence on our ability to identify the rational agents: when b increases, the noise generated through the social interactions with the other agents should make it more difficult to identify rational agents correctly. On the other hand, when rational agents are not part of the social network (b = 0), and thus do not care about potentially inconsistent beliefs of others, it should become easier to correctly identify them with correlation-based procedures. Figure 5 plots the fraction of correctly identified rational agents for a given a max when the interaction parameter b takes on values in [0, 1] . The different plots in Figure 5 refer to increasing values of a max in the simulations. As expected, our ability to correctly identify the group of rational agents depends inversely on their interaction parameter b, possibly approaching the noise level as b approaches the value common to the otherÑ agents. On the other hand, when b approaches zero we are in an increasingly comfortable position regarding the identification of rational agents since b → 0 essentially eliminates the noise around the signal. Finally, the faster the signal processing ability a max , the easier it becomes to correctly identify the group of rational agents, asymptotically reaching the value of one hundred percent independently of b. So what can we conclude from this computational experiment? Although we can quite accurately identify groups of agents when social interactions are weak (b 1), the high correlations are generated by the agents' coordination on the (exogenously given) true state of the world. Therefore, the identification of groups based on correlations in survey responses cannot be considered as definite proof of the existence of social interactions.
Discussion and Conclusions
All computations in the preceding scenarios have been performed under the assumption that the OM informs us of the actual number e i of neighbors for each agent. Clearly, this is a most unrealistic assumption in the context of empirical applications to survey data, where we simply have no way of knowing whether agents interact socially in the first place, much less to whom they are linked to in case they do. Viewed from this perspective, our results are if anything overly optimistic to begin with.
Yet the third scenario delivers maybe the most fatal blow to any hopes that survey data could settle the question whether interaction effects are present in the expectations formation process of respondents or not. Our preferred way to read Figure 5 is that we can achieve any desired accuracy in the identification of network structure through an appropriate combination of b and a time-varying exogenous signal a max . The other side of that coin is that we have no way of distinguishing between interaction effects and model-consistent beliefs, even if we identify relatively strong patterns in the correlations of a subset of agents.
Ultimately, these results suggest that existing survey data cannot facilitate our understanding of the process of expectations formation, which is particularly troubling in light of its central importance for modern macroeconomic theory. To end on a more constructive note, we would like to point out once more that our thought experiment presumed that we merely have data on the time evolution of agents' beliefs. In order to investigate whether interaction effects are indeed present in the data, it would be enormously helpful if surveys contained questions that refer directly to the presence of interaction effects.
